The 9th Eastern Economic Forum (EEF) in Vladivostok creates new power dynamics and reflects the strategic intent by Russia to further bolster its weight and extended influence in the Global South and emerging powers in the non-Western bloc.

It sends a message to the West that despite the sanctions and the efforts to isolate Russia, it still has the option to increase leverage on other non-Western parties and allies to increase Moscow’s economic and trade options.

The invitation by Russian President Vladimir Putin himself to Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim reflects the inner and bigger overview and strategic intent in courting Malaysia, seeing the bigger potential and future role the country can play both in economic and diplomatic manoeuvres in strengthening the Global South and an independent power balancing approach.

Historical good ties with the region especially in the realm of defence and security will still be the primary domain of using this as the main yardstick in expanding other positive ripple impact on the economic and trade sector.

Malaysia is important to the region and will decide the direction of ASEAN next year. Malaysia’s participation in the Eastern Economic Forum and the invitation are thus seen as thus necessary for this larger purpose.

This presents a strategic and vital opening for Russia to engage more with Malaysia, especially when Malaysia is also trapped between the duopoly of China and the US in the region.

Malaysia’s New Emerging Role

Malaysia is seen to be the gateway to further engagement with the region, the Arab world and the Global South, and this is seen as providing returns to the country as well, with growing leadership in critical industries of the future including semiconductor, critical minerals, digital economy, advanced technology, energy security and transition, and food and supply chain security.

This goes well in complementing Russia's efforts to widen its fallback options and, most importantly, in extending Russia's entry and ease of entry into the region, and inviting Malaysia to join the Forum is thus a natural progression.

Russia was Malaysia’s 8th largest trading partner among European countries last year, with total bilateral trade increasing by 15.6 per cent to RM14.22 billion (US$3.1 billion), compared to RM12.3 billion (US$2.79 billion) recorded in 2022.

Malaysia’s strength in halal product development and the Islamic finance is also key, along with the vital new role of the future in new economic domains and conventional means including oil and gas and commodities, and the strategic role as a middle power and power balancer in the region.

Malaysia is among the countries prioritised for potential BRICS membership, and Putin had personally extended an invitation to the Prime Minister to participate in the forthcoming BRICS Summit in Kazan next month.

With this new support and assurance, Malaysia is hoping to widen its trade and economic basket and to align deeper with the Global South and emerging economic powers as an extended platform in sustaining its economic options and transition.

People-to-people ties between KL and Moscow also remain a focus, and efforts are being made to boost cultural understanding and appreciation and tourism and education. Malaysia received over 100,000 tourist arrivals from Russia last year, with efforts to increase flight connectivity.

In serving as the connecting point to Southeast Asia, Russia is expected to find new points of contact with ASEAN when Malaysia becomes ASEAN chairman in 2025.

Malaysia also desires food and energy security, and Russia is seen to be able to play a new role in this and Malaysia’s participation is always in line with its stance of independence and autonomy in its option to choose economic and diplomatic partners.

Malaysia’s participation in the Forum is part of the continuation of strategic hedging and balancing, and increasing diversity in its trade diversification.

This is seen as the continuation of the move to affiliate with and join BRICS, as a message that Malaysia remains autonomous and independent in charting its own economic and diplomatic direction without the baggage and pressure from the escalating power pressure.

It can be deemed and seen by other powers as another strategic move for Malaysia to widen its basket away from the China-centric economic and trade dependence, and Russia-Malaysia ties have always been solidified by historical good rapport and partnership in science and defence.

This participation in the EEF can also be seen as Malaysia still having the new option of deepening ties with Russia, and that it provides new assurances in economic and energy returns as well as the defence and security realm.

Malaysia is seen to serve as a growing power in the region that can provide long-term balancing power to both the West and, potentially, Beijing.

Malaysia will also want added trade and economic options apart from RCEP, IPEF and the array of bilateral FTAs and regional ASEAN FTAs.

BRICS and other counterweight domains provide these dual returns of encapsulating geopolitical clout and weight in elevating its position as a middle power and potentially as a catapult in strengthening its role as a power balancer and deeper role in the power dichotomy in the region.

New Regional Importance to Russia

The region’s thirst and quest are for food and supply chain and energy security and, most importantly, defence and security support and assurance, both through hardware military assets and potential future bulwark of defence support in technology and other high-end assets and strength which have not been traditionally introduced or needed in the region, especially missile defence.

It is also a message to the region and East Asia that Russia is now an emerging player and power in this geographical and economic domain that has been traditionally held by China.

Moscow realises that the region of Southeast Asia has been long trapped by the dual power dominance of Beijing and its rivalry with Washington. Hence, the Russian presence is seen to be apt in providing the needed third credible force in the power dynamics and calculations.

Moscow’s increased defence and economic friend-shoring efforts in Southeast Asia are part of the approaches to increase its dependence on non-Western parties and the Global South capacity, especially when Southeast Asia has been seen to be traditionally strong in its balancing and hedging approach, out of the region’s fear of increased Western and Chinese overtures and presence in the power struggle.

The Southeast Asian region forms the connecting domain in completing the arch of Russia’s near and far border interests, as the next complementing theatre apart from Central Asia, South Asia and Africa, and the Arctic.

Moscow’s influence and geopolitical grip on the Arctic also holds the next key factor in the new maritime route of the Northern Sea Route and the potential of oil and gas deposits and explorations that will complement and boost its existing Siberian advantage for its food security and production, with the impact of global warming providing both Siberia and the Arctic with new lifelines and eventual productive volume returns in terms of food and fossil fuel.

The moves through the EEF and the defence and economic friend-shoring efforts also serve as a message to China that Russia still has the upper card and is now on the verge of charting its own independent quest to increase its economic and defence friend-shoring and alliance building, despite the No Limits Ties.

Historical wariness between both countries, and Putin’s visit to Vietnam, Mongolia and North Korea and the increased role and influence in Central Asia in a sense create wariness for Beijing because these are the traditional allies and partners of China, and that the overtures by Putin are seen as encroaching into the traditional orbit of Beijing.

Russia still holds the advantage in long-term food, energy and critical defence and military technology and resilience in the region, and this is seen as another fallback for the region to have a new credible third option.

Both conventional and non-conventional returns, with the combined weight of defence assurances and energy and food security with less strings attached, make Russia the natural transition in expanding the region’s options and filling the long-held gaps that have long trapped the region.

Despite this, the region is still pragmatic and smart enough to keep Washington and Beijing close to its cards, in ensuring a stable and safe region and simultaneously getting the best security assurances and outcome from the power triangle.

-- BERNAMA

Collins Chong Yew Keat is a Foreign Affairs, Strategy and Security Analyst with Universiti Malaya.