THE WAR THAT IS FRACTURING AMERICA’S PREPONDERANCE IN THE GULF

By Phar Kim Beng

KUALA LUMPUR, March 8 (Bernama) -- The assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, together with senior defence and security officials during the opening phase of the United States–Israel assault on Iran has dramatically altered the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East.

What began as a campaign designed to neutralise Iran’s strategic capabilities has now evolved into a far more complex confrontation whose consequences extend beyond Iran itself.

Khamenei, who was 86 and reportedly suffering from cancer, had already been preparing the Iranian political system for transition.

He had convened meetings with ministers and senior leaders to consolidate authority and maintain continuity.

Yet when the strikes occurred, the entire upper echelon of Iran’s security leadership was effectively wiped out.

In Iran’s political culture, martyrdom is not merely symbolic. It carries enormous mobilising power.

The deaths of Khamenei and his senior commanders may therefore deepen Iranian nationalism rather than weaken it.

The expectation among Washington and Tel Aviv that leadership decapitation could rapidly paralyse Iran may prove dangerously optimistic.

Even more alarming is the strategic environment that now surrounds the Gulf region.

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), along with neighbouring states such as Turkiye and even Cyprus, suddenly finds itself exposed.

Iran’s retaliatory capacity, whether through missiles, drones, cyber operations or proxy networks, can easily extend beyond its immediate borders. Energy installations, shipping routes and tourism infrastructure are all vulnerable to disruption.

The Gulf region is not simply a regional theatre. It is the heart of the global energy system.

Any escalation that destabilises the Gulf immediately reverberates across Asia, Europe and beyond.

For many countries, the conflict has also revealed the shrinking space for neutrality in an era of great-power rivalry.

Spain provides a telling example. Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez initially resisted allowing the United States to use Spanish facilities for operations related to the war. His government attempted to maintain a cautious distance from the conflict.

However, economic realities quickly intervened. The risk of severe trade disruption with the United States forced Madrid to reconsider its position.

Spain ultimately reversed course, illustrating how difficult neutrality has become when economic dependence intersects with geopolitical pressure.

The lesson is stark. In the emerging international order, smaller and middle powers increasingly find themselves compelled to choose sides—even when doing so contradicts their strategic preferences.

The United Kingdom offers another example of the dilemma facing Western allies.

Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer has attempted to maintain a middle ground by emphasising adherence to international law and the need for restraint.

Yet this position has not been well received in Washington.

President Donald Trump has reportedly shown open contempt for Starmer’s cautious approach, even suggesting that the British leader lacks the stature of figures such as Winston Churchill.

Such rhetoric reveals a growing fracture within the Western alliance itself.

While European leaders seek to preserve the legitimacy of international law, Washington appears increasingly willing to pursue unilateral strategies to achieve its objectives.

The decision to involve Israel directly in the attack on Iran has further complicated matters.

Historically, American leaders have been extremely cautious about allowing Israel to participate openly in major regional conflicts.

During the 1991 Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush went to extraordinary lengths to prevent Israeli involvement.

At the time, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein fired Scud missiles into Israeli territory in an attempt to provoke retaliation.

Bush understood that if Israel responded militarily, the fragile Arab coalition supporting the United States would collapse.

For this reason, Washington pressured the then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir to exercise restraint despite intense domestic pressure inside Israel.

The current situation stands in sharp contrast.

By bringing Israel directly into the conflict against Iran, Washington has fundamentally altered the political optics of the war across the Arab world.

Many GCC states, while deeply wary of Iran’s regional ambitions, remain highly sensitive to Israeli military actions in the Middle East.

Public opinion across the Arab world remains overwhelmingly sceptical—if not hostile—towards Israel.

Consequently, the joint US–Israel military campaign risks inflaming regional sentiment in ways that could destabilise governments that are otherwise quietly cooperating with Washington.

The economic implications are equally troubling.

The Gulf economies rely heavily on stability to sustain energy production, financial flows and tourism.

Cities such as Dubai, Doha and Abu Dhabi have spent decades transforming themselves into global hubs for finance, aviation and hospitality.

War in the Gulf threatens to undermine these achievements.

Missile strikes, drone attacks or maritime disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz could instantly damage investor confidence and tourist arrivals.

Even limited instability can trigger major economic consequences.

Insurance premiums for shipping would rise dramatically.

Oil prices could spike. Financial markets across Asia and Europe would feel the shock almost immediately.

Ironically, this means that the war intended to contain Iran may end up imposing severe costs on America’s own partners in the Gulf.

Perhaps more significantly, Israel’s direct participation in the conflict risks alienating the very Arab states that Washington has spent years trying to bring closer to Israel through diplomatic normalisation.

Recent diplomatic efforts had begun to reshape the regional landscape, with several Arab governments cautiously exploring cooperation with Israel. Those fragile diplomatic openings could now be reversed.

From the perspective of many in the GCC and the broader Arab world, the war increasingly appears less like a defensive campaign and more like a destructive intervention that threatens the stability of the entire Gulf region.

If this perception hardens, Washington and Tel Aviv may discover that their military success on the battlefield does not translate into political legitimacy across the region.

In international politics, perception often matters as much as power.

The war against Iran may have begun with the objective of weakening Tehran’s strategic capabilities.

Yet the broader consequences may reshape regional alignments in unpredictable ways.

Instead of isolating Iran, the conflict could deepen resentment across the Arab world while exposing the vulnerabilities of America’s own partners in the Gulf.

For Washington and Tel Aviv, the greatest danger may not be military defeat, but strategic overreach.

And in the complex geopolitics of the Middle East, overreach rarely ends well.

-- BERNAMA

Phar Kim Beng, PhD, is Professor of ASEAN Studies at International Islamic University of Malaysia and Director of the Institute of International and ASEAN Studies (IINTAS).

(The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of BERNAMA)